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The Amending Clause in the New York
Constitution and Conventionphobia
By Gerald Benjamin*
The amending clause is the nineteenth of the New York
State Constitution’s twenty articles.1 Followed only by the
enacting clause,2 for all intents and purposes this is the
document’s final word. Well, maybe not the final word. An
alternative is to think of this amending clause as a part of an
ongoing several-centuries-long conversation. The clause is a
message from one past group of designers and drafters of New
York’s governing system, the 1846 Constitutional Convention
majority, to all of us who gave them the charge to “secure [for
us] the blessings of freedom,”3 that is to “we the people” of New
York:
Here it is, our best effort to design governing
institutions for you, empower and limit them,
create balance among them, specify how those who
will operate them be chosen and held
accountable—in short, create for us all a
representative democracy.
Now, nobody is perfect. Certainly, we don’t
think we are. We know that actual experience is a
Gerald Benjamin is the Associate Vice President for Regional Engagement
and Director of the Benjamin Center at SUNY New Paltz. The Benjamin
Center does research on regional policy issues in the Hudson Valley. Benjamin
became a Distinguished Professor, the university’s highest rank, by action of
the SUNY Board of Trustees in 2002. Benjamin’s most recent book is NEW
YORK’S BROKEN CONSTITUTION: THE GOVERNANCE CRISIS AND THE PATH TO
RENEWED GREATNESS (Peter J. Galie, Christopher Bopst & Gerald Benjamin,
eds., 2016). He earned a B.A. with distinction from St. Lawrence University.
His Masters (1967) and Doctoral (1970) degrees in Political Science are from
Colombia University. This article was adapted from the author’s remarks
delivered on March 24, 2017 at The New York State Constitution, a symposium
of PACE LAW REVIEW, held at Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University.
1. N.Y. CONST. art. XIX.
2. N.Y. CONST. art. XX.
3. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. XIII, § 2; DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE
NEW-YORK STATE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION 851-852
(1846) [hereinafter DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS].
*
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great teacher.
As they govern in the future, those we elect to
operate this governance system, in the manner that
this constitution specifies, might find flaws in it or
even determine that with the passage of time an
alternative set of ideas has arisen that would be
better at securing the blessings of freedom. So, we
provide here for those in government to ask us, the
people, for specific changes—amendments or for
permission to start a process at some later time to
choose another group like us with its sole job to
develop that alternative—constitutional revision.
Mind you, we do not propose to allow those we
choose to run the government day-to-day in accord
with this constitution to make these changes
themselves. The institutions that they populate are
created in our constitution by “we, the people”—
and therefore changes in these have to come back
for approval by we the people of New York of a later
day, as in accord with the enduring purpose of
securing the blessings of liberty for all.
But, in thinking this through, we designers
and drafters worried that at some future time
those running this governmental system, the one
that we are giving to you the people in this draft
constitution to consider for approval through a
direct
participatory
process—a
statewide
referendum vote—may not recognize what others
outside the government regard as flaws in this
system, maybe even because they and their
friends—those who are in charge—personally or
politically benefit from the way things work, the
status quo. So, we designers and drafters decided
to create a way around the self-interest of those in
power. That’s why we ask you to agree to ask
yourselves every twenty years whether you are
satisfied with how this governance system we
propose for you in this constitution is actually
working.
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That question is “Shall there be a convention
to revise the constitution and amend the same?”4
So we are gathered here today, March 24, 2017, in White Plains,
NY, the place in which our Provincial Congress received the
Declaration of Independence, to enter into a conversation about
what our answer should be to a question written for us 171 years
ago in Albany, our state capitol.5
Though popular sovereignty was a core idea of the
Revolutionary Era, it took a while for New Yorkers to invent a
way for bringing people formally into redefining the structures
and processes of governance.6 The state’s first constitution was
not adopted at a convention, but by the following (Fourth)
Provincial Congress, albeit with a special mandate “to institute
and establish a government.”7 The 1801 Convention was called
by the legislature; its work was not offered for public approval.8
In another incremental step, the adoption of the work of the
conventions of 1821 and 1846, both created by the legislature,
were made subject to popular referendum.9
“Faced with mounting debts, charges of legislative
corruption and inefficiency, and urgent decisions on the future
of the state’s development policy,” one leading authority wrote of
the era in which the 1846 constitution was adopted, “New
Yorkers began to reevaluate the role of government in society
and to question some of the basic premises of their system.”10
The new amending clause, with an independent role for the
people not only in ratifying but in initiating the constitutional
change process, was one element in that constitution’s broad
effort to democratize state government.11
The required
4. Narrative by author, Gerald Benjamin.
5. See DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS, supra note 3, at 851-52; 1 CHARLES Z.
LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 226 (1906).
6. LINCOLN, supra note 5, at 102 (noting that “[t]he discussion and
agitation of the subject of constitutional reform, which had continued many
years, bore little fruit.”).
7. PETER J. GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW
YORK 36 (1996) [hereinafter ORDERED LIBERTY].
8. Id. at 66.
9. Id. at 109-10.
10. L. RAY GUNN, THE DECLINE OF AUTHORITY PUBLIC ECONOMIC POLICY
AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK STATE, 1800-1860, at 21 (1988).
11. See DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS, supra note 3, at 851-52 (“[t]he
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referendum question on calling a convention has been asked of
every generation of New Yorkers since.12
The ballot question will be asked for the seventh mandated
time this coming November 7, 2017 (that’s what brings us here
today).13 With the major league baseball season in the offing, I
can’t resist an analogy. The result has been a base hit, two home
runs, and, lately, three strikeouts. The mandatory question
resulted in conventions in 1867, 1894, and 1938, all with
Republican majorities.14 The product of the 1867 Convention
failed to gain popular ratification, though it had important longterm effects on New York governance.15 The 1894 Convention
gave us a new constitution, New York’s fourth.16 The 1938
Convention is famous for its positive rights achievements.17 But
most recently, in 1957, 1977 and 1997 New Yorkers have
rejected taking up the opportunity to hold a constitutional
convention.18
A phobia to the idea has developed, not only in New York
but across the nation.19 The mandatory question has not
resulted in a convention in New York for seventy-nine years.20
No state has held a constitutional convention for several
Convention [has] therefore presented the subject in the form that will best
enable the people to judge between the old and the new Constitution. If the
Constitution now proposed by adopted, the happiness and progress of the
People of this State, will . . . be in their own hands.”).
12. N.Y. CONST. art. XIX § 2.
13. Gerald Benjamin, “All or Nothing at All” Changing the Constitution –
The Reform Dilemma, in NEW YORK’S BROKEN CONSTITUTION: THE GOVERNANCE
CRISIS AND THE PATH TO RENEWED GREATNESS 285, 297 (Peter J. Galie,
Christopher Bopst & Gerald Benjamin eds., 2016) [hereinafter NEW YORK’S
BROKEN CONSTITUTION]. Additionally, the legislature has put the question on
the ballot twice in 1915 and 1967. Id.
14. ORDERED LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 119, 159-60, 232-33.
15. Id. at 131-32.
16. N.Y. CONST. of 1894; 4 WILLIAM H. STEELE, REVISED RECORD OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK MAY 8, 1984 TO
SEPTEMBER 29, 1984, at 1276-77 (1900).
17. See ORDERED LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 238.
18. See Benjamin, supra note 13, at 297.
The work of conventions called at legislative initiative, in 1915 and 1967, were
rejected at the polls. Id. The 1915 majority was Republican; that of 1967 was
Democrat. See ORDERED LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 188, 307-08.
19. See
Gerald
Benjamin
&
Thomas
Gais,
Constitutional
Conventionphobia, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 53, 69-71 (1996).
20. See ORDERED LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 233.
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decades.21 The half-century since the 1967 convention, called by
the legislature, is the longest time-period since such a convening
in New York state history.22
So, the sovereign people have forborne. One notion is that
this may be the result of their overall satisfaction with their
state government: “We don’t need a convention; government is
working well.” This proposition is problematic on its face. For
starters, the circumstances that faced New York in 1846 are
eerily familiar today: corruption in the legislature (and the
executive), economic development challenges, and burdensome
debt.23 Additionally, we are heavily taxed, have a judiciary and
local government arrangements that cry out for consolidation
and reform, endure non-competitive gerrymandered legislative
districts, finance public education in a problematic way, and
suffer abysmal election administration and voter turnout. All is
definitely not ok. Something else, or some things else, makes
the idea of holding a state constitutional convention less
attractive in the last hundred years than it was in the previous
hundred years.
An initial concern is that the mandated convention question
added by the drafters in 1846 is unlimited. This means a
constitutional convention cannot be called with a focused
agenda. Rather, once a convention is convened, it may change
anything in the constitution. Since the mid-nineteenth century
New York, one-by-one, and usually at conventions, has added
many constitutional provisions of particular interest to interests
21. Reid Wilson, Rhode Island Could Become the First State in 30 years to
Hold a Constitutional Convention, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 13, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/03/13/rhode-islandcould-become-the-first-state-in-30-years-to-hold-a-constitutionalconvention/?utm_term=.6fb5c073d622. The most recent state constitutional
convention was called by the state of Rhode Island and held in 1986. See R.I.
CONST. of 1986; Introduction: Constitution of the State of Rhode Island
and Providence Plantations, STATE OF R.I. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://webserver.ri
lin.state.ri.us/RiConstitution/constintro.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2017).
22. J.H. Snider, Opportunity for Reform: Educate New Yorkers on
Constitutional Convention, TIMES UNION http://www.timesunion.com/tuplusopinion/article/Commentary-Opportunity-for-reform11210916.php (last updated June 12, 2017, 9:47 AM).
23. See ROBERT B. WARD, NEW YORK STATE GOVERNMENT 15-18 (2d ed.
2006); 2 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 10
(1906) (noting by 1846, “[y]ear by year this dissatisfaction grew and found
expression in prolonged discussion and numerous proposed amendments.”).
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that have become increasingly powerful in the state. Civil
service guarantees and pension protections are of great
importance to organized public employees.24 Environmentalists
are deeply committed to the “forever wild” protection afforded
the Catskill and Adirondack preserves.25 Advocates for the poor
greatly value the unique state constitutional protections
afforded them in New York.26 It is unlikely that any convention
comprised of delegates elected in New York would remove or
even mitigate these strongly supported provisions. Yet the
aggregated effect of the concerns of particular interests—even in
the face of pandemic governmental dysfunction—is deep
skepticism about calling a convention.27
For much of the twentieth century, there was a political
center that favored calling constitutional conventions in New
York.28 As the great Democrat Governor Alfred E. Smith noted,
the redistricting formula written into the 1894 Constitution
made the state legislature “constitutionally Republican.”29 With
Republicans dominant in that branch there was no hope of
changing this stranglehold through the legislature, so
Democrats sought their opportunity in two ways: through
24. See N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7 (protecting pension and retirement
benefits); id. art. XVI, § 5 (excluding pensions from taxation); ORDERED
LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 234 (discussing the 1938 enactment of the “Labor Bill
of Rights” found in N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 17).
25. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; Paul Bray, “Forever Wild” The
Treatment of Conservation and the Environment by the New York State
Constitution, in NEW YORK’S BROKEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 243, 24344 (discussing the 1894 enactment commonly referred to as the “forever wild”
provision).
26. See N.Y. CONST., art. XVII, § 1; ORDERED LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 238
(the Convention of 1938 “established an affirmative social right which any
individual may demand from the government. It required the state to assume
a major role in the field of social welfare.”).
27. See Nathan Tempey, Pandora’s Box or Reset Button? Unions, Activists
Square
Off
Over
Upcoming
Constitutional
Convention
Vote,
GOTHAMIST (June 6, 2017, 10:42 AM), http://gothamist.com/2017/06/06/ny_con
stitutional_convention.php; see also Snider, supra note 22.
28. Benjamin, supra note 13, at 296-97.
29. Henrik N. Dullea, We the People, in MAKING A MODERN CONSTITUTION:
THE PROSPECTS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN NEW YORK 21, 25 (Rose M.
Bailly & Scott N. Fein eds., 2016) [hereinafter MAKING A MODERN
CONSTITUTION]; Jeffrey Wice & Todd A. Breitbart, These Seats May Not Be
Saved: A Fair and Rule-Bound Legislative Reapportionment Process, in NEW
YORK’S BROKEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 113, 126-27.
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litigation and by the calling of a constitutional convention.30 An
example: the 1915 Convention was called on legislative initiative
during a brief period of Democrat legislative control.31 But after
the one-person-one-vote United States Supreme Court decisions
of the 1960’s,32 and the 1974 Democrat capture of the state
assembly,33 both major parties gained a stake in
gerrymandering: the Republicans in the senate and the
Democrats in the assembly.34 The result was a division of the
spoils through collaboration in a bi-partisan gerrymander.35
It is no surprise that the state legislature resists calling a
constitutional convention through a referendum.36 After all, the
process was designed to bypass it.37 More important than the
fact of opposition is the great priority the legislature has recently
given to assuring that no convention occurs.38 Interest groups
seeking legislative support for their goals know that supporting
a convention is not a good idea.39 Appropriations for a bipartisan
commission to prepare for the mandatory referendum vote were
formerly common. In 1993, legislative leaders refused to give
support to a commission proposed by Governor Mario Cuomo to
prepare for the 1997 vote (he found a way to proceed without
them.).40 In 2016, the leaders insisted that the one-million-dollar

30. Dullea, supra note 29, at 26-28.
31. ORDERED LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 188-89.
32. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964).
33. See Josh Barbanel, Democratic Edge Rises in New York Assembly,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/03/nyregion/demo
cratic-edge-rises-in-new-york-assembly.html?mcubz=1; see also Wice &
Breitbart, supra note 29, at 126-127.
34. Barbanel, supra note 33.
35. Id.
36. John Dinan, The Political Dynamics of Mandatory State
Constitutional Convention Referendums: Lessons from the 2000s Regarding
Obstacles and Pathways to Their Passage, 71 MONT. L. REV. 395, 421 (2010).
37. Id.
38. Snider, supra note 22.
39. Id.
40. See Kevin Sack, Cuomo Calls for Early Vote on Constitutional
Convention, NY TIMES (May 27, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/27/ny
region/cuomo-calls-for-early-vote-on-constitutional-convention.html?mcubz=1;
Lisa W. Foderaro, A Constitutional Convention for New York? This May Be the
Year, NY TIMES (July 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/nyregion/
constitutional-convention-voting-new-york.html?mcubz=1.
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appropriation proposed by Governor Andrew Cuomo for a
preparatory commission be removed from the state budget.41 As
we meet, such a commission has not been formed.42
Comparative research shows that substantive preparation and
gubernatorial support is key to a successful referendum vote.43
Without these, opponents—sometimes the very persons who
have denied the resources—argue that a convention is unwise
because the state is unprepared.
In reaction to the seven-yearlong partisan political deadlock
centered on the delegate selection process that blocked the
convening of the constitutional convention called by the voters
in 1886,44 delegates in 1894 sought to create a process for future
conventions that was “self-executing” once they were authorized
by the voters.45 The Republican majority entrenched their
preferred delegate selection process in the constitution, placing
it out of the reach of ordinary legislative processes.46 It required
three delegates to be selected from senate districts functioning
as multi-member districts, with fifteen chose at-large
statewide.47
Because senate districts have long been gerrymandered to
produce Republican majorities, this looks deeply suspect to
Democrats.48 Because multi-member districts may be used to
diminish the electoral impact of racial and ethnic minorities—
most of whom vote Democrat—and therefore raise red flag under

41. See David H. King, A Post-Budget Test of the Governor’s Commitment
to a Constitutional Convention, GOTHAM GAZETTE, (April 18, 2016),
http://www.gothamgazette.com/state/6283-a-post-budget-test-of-the-governors-commitment-to-a-constitutional-convention.
42. Rachel Silberstein, Constitutional Convention Absent from Cuomo’s
2017 Agenda, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.gothamgazette.co
m/state/6720-constitutional-convention-absent-from-cuomo-s-2017-agenda.
43. Gerald Benjamin, Constitutional Change in New York State: Process
and Issues, in MAKING A MODERN CONSTITUTION, supra note 29, at 57, 71;
Snider, supra note 22.
44. ORDERED LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 159.
45. Id. at 179.
46. Benjamin, supra note 43, at 63.
47. N.Y. CONST. art XIX, § 2.
48. Wice & Breitbart, supra note 29, at 130-131. See generally
Gerrymandering and Relying on the Miscount of Prisoners Combine to Violate
the U.S. Constitution in New York, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, https://www.pri
sonersofthecensus.org/nygerrymander.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).
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the (now attenuated) Federal Voting Rights Act,49 this suspicion
is reinforced. This notwithstanding that there are over three
million more enrolled Democrats than Republicans in New York
State,50 that current senate districts produce a Democrat
majority (though that party does not organize the chamber),51
and that fourteen senate districts currently elect Black or
Hispanic members.52
Some of the other procedural specifics added by the 1894
Convention in reaction to its experience—for example those
setting dates certain on which delegates were to be elected and
the convention called into session, seating delegates if an
election outcome was uncertain, and defining a process for filling
vacancies53—are not currently controversial. But others have
caused reformers that likely would otherwise be supportive of a
convention to insist on procedural reform before they sign on.
For example, the 1894 Convention found it “prudent” to add
a provision that convention delegates be compensated and
reimbursed for expenses at the same rate as state legislators,
amounts that in that era was specified in the constitution.54
However, no restrictions were placed upon whom might serve as

49. Steven Hill, How the Voting Rights Act Hurts Democrats & Minorities,
THE ATLANTIC (June 17, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2
013/06/how-the-voting-rights-act-hurts-democrats-and-minorities/276893/.
50. N.Y. STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, NYS VOTER ENROLLMENT BY COUNTY,
PARTY AFFILIATION, AND STATUS (April 1, 2017), http://www.elections.ny.gov/N
YSBOE/enrollment/county/county_apr17.pdf.
51. Jesse McKinley, Breakaway Democrats in New York Senate Add
Another to Their Ranks, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/01/25/nyregion/independent-democratic-conference-republicans-statesenate.html?mcubz=1.
52. Thomas Kaplan, G.O.P. Senate Deal: Diversity Takes Back Seat to
Power in Albany, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12
/07/nyregion/in-gop-state-senate-deal-diversity-takes-backseat.html?mcubz=1&mtrref=www.google.com.
53. N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art. XIV, § 2.
54. Id. (“Every delegate shall receive for his services the same
compensation and the same mileage as shall then be annually payable to the
members of the Assembly.”); id. art. III, § 6 (“Each member of the Legislature
shall receive for his serves an annual salary of one thousand five hundred
dollars. The members of either house shall also receive the sum of one dollar
for every ten miles . . . .”). Regarding the rationale for placing this detail in the
constitution see remarks of Louis Marshall, chair of the Committee on Future
Amendments. See STEELE supra 16, at 893-94.
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delegates.55 Therefore, incumbent legislators and judges who
were elected as delegates to later conventions were compensated
twice in one year.56 This “double dipping,” which extended to
pension benefits, was almost universally condemned and
remains an issue in debates over whether a convention should
be called.57
Other process concerns are statutory. Unless specific
legislation is passed to govern nomination and election of
convention delegates, this must be done in accord with existing
election law. The process would thus be partisan, and accessible
to the influence of big money. Though this might be mitigated
by the use of election technology now in place, having to operate
under current law would also likely make it difficult to vote for
individuals for at-large delegate positions—rather than an
entire partisan slate.
Since 1894, changes to the amending process for the New
York State Constitution have been minimal. One of some
significance concerned mandatory referendum timing.58
Initially, delegate elections were required to be in next ensuing
year in which assembly members were chosen; this was not
limiting as the term of the assembly was then one year.59 In
1936, delegates decided that the next convention vote should be
in 1957 (not 1956, twenty years from the vote that called the
convention that made this change.)60 This altered timing would
ensure that if a convention were called delegates would be
elected in an even-numbered year simultaneous with a
gubernatorial election, and the convention itself would occur in
an odd-numbered year, bringing more public attention to its
work.61

55. 3 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK
666-670 (1906).
56. See N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art. III § 6, (legislators); id. art. VI § 12
(judges).
57. What is the process of the New York State Constitutional
Convention?, CITIZENS UNION, http://betterny.citizensunion.org/new-yorkconstitutional-convention-faq/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2017).
58. Benjamin, supra note 43, at 57-59.
59. N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art. XIV § 2; id. art. II, § 2.
60. Benjamin, supra note 13, at 58-59.
61. Franklin Feldman, A Constitutional Convention in New York:
Fundamental Law and Basic Politics, 42 CORNELL L. REV. 329 (1957).
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One less visible potential consequence of this choice was to
give New York City greater influence on acceptance of a
convention’s recommendations, as its mayoral election—
stimulating turnout there—was made simultaneous with the
referendum on that work.62 This is a lesser political factor now.
City turnout, in general, has dropped significantly over time,63
and all the biggest upstate counties have their own executives
elected in odd-numbered years. However, this change in timing
made New York the only state that holds its mandatory
referendum on calling a convention in a lower turnout oddnumbered year, with the concomitant smaller statewide
electorate.64 On balance, this likely elevates the influence of
organized interests that oppose a convention call.
In anticipation of the 2017 referendum, there have been
both constitutional amendments and statutes placed before the
An
legislature to address these procedural concerns.65
alternative voting system might mitigate potential voting rights
problems. A dual office hold provision could be used to block
double dipping. Election law for the sole purpose of delegate
election might test ideas for campaign finance reform without
any risk to incumbents in state offices. The constitution might
be modified to permit the calling of a limited convention.
Seeking to make a “yes” vote on the convention call less likely
(and reflecting its hostility to the idea), the legislature has failed
to act upon any of these proposals.
62. David H. King, State Constitutional Convention: Holy Grail or
Pandora’s Box?, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.gothamgazette
.com/government/5861-state-constitutional-convention-holy-grail-orpandoras-box (“New York City voters have historically had the most say over
whether there is a constitutional convention as mayoral elections fall at the
same time as the ballot question is put to voters.”).
63. Ben Brachfeld, 8%! New Report Shows Shockingly Low Voter Turnout
in NYC, GOTHAM GAZETTE (June 28, 2017), http://www.gothamgazette.com/cit
y/7036-8-new-report-shows-shockingly-low-voter-turnout-in-nyc.
64. Benjamin, supra note 13, at 58-59; Gerald Benjamin, The Mandatory
Constitutional Convention Question Referendum: The New York Experience in
National Context, 65 ALB. L. REV. 1017, 1044 (2001) (comparing outcome in
mandatory referendum states from 1970-2000).
65. SPECIAL COMM. ON VOTER PARTICIPATION, N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N, FINAL
REPORT 69-71 (2013); Rachel Silberstein, Cuomo Embraces Voting Reform
Agenda, But Implementation Poses Challenges, GOTHAM GAZETTE
(Jan. 23, 2017) http://www.gothamgazette.com/state/6724-cuomo-embracesvoting-reform-agenda-but-implementation-poses-challenges.
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Our nineteenth century forbearers proceeded with faith in
democracy and a very American—I would say a very New York—
belief in the possibility of progress and improvement. They were
participants in a flow of history in which state leaders were
routinely elected once in a generation—in 1801, 1821, 1846,
1867, and 1894—to revise, renew and reform New York’s
polity.66 They shared the assumption that the best of us in each
generation could if we wished, find the will and talent to produce
a better system to serve us all. And each time a convention
convened they were—at least in some measure—affirmed in this
belief.
That was and is the premise of our amending clause: that
we the people can do better. In that it is a sort of reserve clause,
at least in intent not unlike the Tenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, reserving power to the sovereign people to “secure
the blessings of liberty.”67
Politics in the nineteenth century were rough and tumbled.
Partisan behavior was rarely grounded in reasoned debate.
Voter participation was higher than it is now,68 but not in
referenda, especially New York referenda on constitutional
change.69 Yet our nineteenth century forbearers could not have
imagined a world like ours, in which—admittedly sometimes
based on recent hard experience—democracy is feared as much
or more than it is embraced. A world in which voters at the polls
routinely expressed their rage more than their reason, and are
encouraged in this predisposition by billiondollar campaigns and
skilled image manipulators. A world in which most know little
of intricately balanced polities. A world of political saviors, not
political systems.

66. Peter J. Galie & Christopher Bopst, Constitutional Revision in the
Empire State: A Brief History and Look Ahead, in MAKING A MODERN
CONSTITUTION supra note 29, at 79, 86-87. Interestingly, a convention call
place on the ballot by the legislature in 1858 failed at the polls. See ORDERED
LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 118.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. X; U.S. CONST., pmbl.
68. Nicholas Jahr, Forty Years of Freefall in New York Voter Turnout,
GOTHAM GAZETTE (Nov. 13, 2014) http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/g
overnment/5432-forty-years-of-freefall-in-new-york-voter-turnout.
69. Gerald Benjamin & Carling Devin, Voter Participation and
Persistence: Understanding the Role of Community in Voter Turnout During
Off-Year Elections in New York State, 7 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 545, 572-73.
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In this sort of world, thoughtful people strongly committed
to improving our institutions are put off by change based upon
popular action, especially if it is called constitutional change.
What evidence we have suggests that many New Yorkers do not
even know that we have a state constitution.70 It is not
distinguished in the public mind from the sacrosanct national
Constitution. Even more confounding, opening the national
document to change through a convention is currently under
active discussion in some quarters.71 Such a move is anathema
to people of a great range of persuasions, myself among them.
So we abandon a chance at restoring democracy in our state in
part out of ignorance, in part out of fear.
A generation ago, when confronted with the argument that
New Yorkers would not support the constitutional convention he
favored because of the lack of a shared reform agenda, Governor
Mario Cuomo counseled “faith in the people: faith in
democracy.”72
But twenty years later, do we trust the people? More and
more, the answer is “No.” In fact, the people do not trust each
other. In a recent survey, only about a third of Americans agreed
that “most people can be trusted.”73 In the same survey, forty
percent of respondents said that they had lost faith in
democracy.74 Another six percent said that they had never had
such faith.75 Thus we move on the path from sovereigns to
subjects.

70. Dullea, supra note 29, at 23.
71. Lisa W. Foderaro, A Constitutional Convention for New York?
(July
5,
2017),
This
May
Be
the
Year,
NY
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/nyregion/constitutional-conventionvoting-new-york.html?mcubz=1 (discussing support by NYSBA and Citizens
Union, among others).
72. See Gerald Benjamin & Mario M. Cuomo, Commentary, New York
Needs a Constitutional Convention, WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 10, 2009,
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124718250653620239.
73. Nathan Persiley & Jon Cohen, Americans are Losing Faith in
Democracy-and Each Other, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 14, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/americans-are-losing-faith-indemocracy—and-in-each-other/2016/10/14/b35234ea-90c6-11e6-9c520b10449e33c4_story.html?utm_term=.cf8cbc1efcd0.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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Loss of faith in democracy: at bottom, this is the key reason
that our mandatory referendum convention call has stopped
working.
Yet this method of changing our state constitution is all we
have. It is only through the use of that process that we can begin
to restore this faith, to press the reset button, to reform and repeople our sclerotic, failing half-democratic governing
institutions. We are told that we can change our system by the
other route, through the legislature, that indeed we have been
offered and have passed specific constitutional amendments in
this manner hundreds of times. This proposition is a specious
half-truth. Yes, there has been legislative initiated change, but
not on fundamentals and rarely on matters that challenge those
in power and the institutions they lead or serve.
In the years since our amending clause was adopted and
refined, other more focused institutions have been invented and
used in other states to allow the sovereign people to bypass those
in power if they feel the need to do so.76 One is the constitutional
initiative.77 Another is the constitutional commission.78 Still,
another is the limited constitutional convention. We should
consider these, and perhaps adopt them. But we can only do so
if we call a convention.79
We must seize the opportunity this fall to enter New York’s
centuries-long governance conversation and reshape our
constitutional system for our time and circumstances. We have
the capacity to achieve excellence in our state and local
governments. Now we must demonstrate the will. Our
nineteenth century method for unmediated constitutional
reform is admittedly a blunt instrument. But it the only tool we
have if we are to fashion serious changes in how we govern
ourselves in New York. We must pick it up on November 7, 2016,
and make sure to put it to good use in the years ahead.
I’ll be there to help. Join me.

76.
77.
78.
79.

See Benjamin, supra note 13, at 300-01.
Id.
Id.
See Galie, supra note 66, at 91-101.
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